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ishiguro's inhuman  
aesthetics
Shameem Black
The question of what it means to be human pervades Kazuo 
Ishiguro's novel Never Let Me Go, which gradually reveals a coun-
terfactual twentieth-century England where clone colonies provide 
ready supplies of organs for donation. In the tradition of Aldous 
Huxley's Brave New World (1932) and George Orwell's 1984 (1949), 
the novel envisions a dystopian civil society where clones struggle 
to comprehend the significance of their own circumscribed person-
hood. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this interrogation of what it means 
to be human emerges through a critique of Romantic-inspired as-
sumptions about aesthetics and empathy. While the novel attracts 
attention for its theme of genetic engineering, its deepest anxieties 
arguably concern the ethics of artistic production and consumption 
in an age of multiculturalism and globalization. Through its veneer of 
science fiction, Never Let Me Go offers an allegory both for national 
concerns about the state of England and for transnational fears about 
rising global inequality. In its portrait of the systematic exploitation 
of the clones and its implicit exploration of vulnerable actors in our 
modern economic order, the novel indicts humanist conceptions of 
art as a form of extraction that resembles forced organ donation. If 
Romantic-inspired views of empathy rely on the claim that art reveals 
the human soul, Ishiguro's novel implies that the concept of the soul 
invokes a fundamentally exploitative discourse of use value. In this 
respect, Never Let Me Go shares in a pervasive late-twentieth-century 
cultural skepticism about the viability of empathetic art.
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Yet Ishiguro's critique does not—as might be expected—abandon 
the ethical potential of works of art. Instead, it makes a case for an 
ethics offering a very different approach to art and empathy that re-
lies on the recognition of the inhuman. As an alternative to humanist 
modes of representation, Ishiguro's inhuman style suggests that only 
by recognizing what in ourselves is mechanical, manufactured, and 
replicated—in a traditional sense, not fully human—will we escape 
the barbarities committed in the name of preserving purely human 
life. Never Let Me Go implies that if there is to be any empathetic 
connection with Ishiguro's protagonists, it will not occur through 
the consoling liberal realization that clones are humans, just like 
us. It will evolve through the darker realization that art, along with 
the empathy it provokes, needs to escape the traditional concept 
of the human. The novel thus calls for what seems like a contradic-
tion in terms: an empathetic inhuman aesthetics that embraces the 
mechanical, commodified, and replicated elements of personhood. 
While inhuman is often used as a synonym for cruel or unethical, 
Ishiguro's novel suggests exactly the reverse. As its aesthetics of 
replication allows us to sympathize with others without recourse to 
such constraining ideals, Never Let Me Go reinvents empathy for a 
posthumanist age. 
Empathy, Art, and the Human 
The act of identifying with someone else's experience is deeply 
tied to our everyday understanding of what it means to be human. 
While older traditions of philosophy have presumed that persons are 
fundamentally autonomous and exclusively self-interested, this model 
fails to capture important dimensions of ordinary human behavior. 
Richard Rorty makes this point when he argues that a vast amount 
of Western moral philosophy directs our attention toward what he 
calls "the rather rare figure of the psychopath, the person who has 
no concern for any human being other than himself" (123). Indeed, 
modern psychological accounts afford empathy a significant place 
within social and biological narratives of human development. Brought 
into English as a translation of the German aesthetic term Einfühlung, 
the term empathy entered English in 1909 through the work of the 
American psychologist E. B. Tichener (Wispé 78).1 Tichener used the 
word to describe a physical process in which infants between birth 
and ten months began to mimic the nonverbal expressions of those 
around them (Omdahl 25). Known as motor mimicry, this nonver-
bal bodily process was understood to exemplify the instinctive and 
physiological basis of shared feelings.2 In the 1980s, the American 
developmental psychologist Martin Hoffman showed how the motor 
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mimicry of infants could lead to more sophisticated cognitive forms 
of empathy once children recognized their separation from other 
people. Hoffman ultimately argued that the development of empathy 
enabled individuals to form moral judgments and to take moral ac-
tions (Goleman 105). 
Well before modern developmental psychology, empathy (or 
its synonym in an earlier era, sympathy) assumed a privileged role 
in theories of literature and ethics. (While some philosophers stress 
technical differences between sympathy and empathy, I use them both 
to denote the process of identifying with the experience of others.) 
While these theories emerged in eighteenth-century philosophy, as in 
Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), they reached new 
intensity in the work of the British Romantics. Most radically, William 
Hazlitt argued that a robust sense of self actually requires the same 
imaginative leaps that we associate with empathy for others. For 
Hazlitt, our link to our own future selves is more tenuous than our 
common sense tells us. Instead, his 1805 An Essay on the Principles 
of Human Action argues that our grasp of our own future relies on the 
same type of imaginative projection that helps us infer the interior 
selves of others. Hazlitt concluded his thread of thought by linking 
this cognitive capacity to ethical action: "I could not love myself, if I 
were not capable of loving others" (3). The aesthetic manifestos of 
William Wordsworth and Percy Bysshe Shelley embedded such ethics 
of empathetic imaginative projection into their defenses of aesthetic 
pursuits. "In spite of difference of soil or climate, of language and 
manners, of laws and customs, in spite of things silently gone out of 
mind and things violently destroyed," Wordsworth proclaimed in his 
Preface to Lyrical Ballads, "the Poet binds together by passion and 
knowledge the vast empire of human society, as it is spread over 
the whole earth, and over all time" (259). Shelley, in similar terms, 
declared that a "man, to be greatly good, must imagine intensely and 
comprehensively; he must put himself in the place of another and of 
many others; the pains and pleasures of his species must become 
his own. The great instrument of moral good is the imagination; and 
poetry administers to the effect by acting upon the cause" (759). 
These Romantic conceptions found even greater scope in Victorian 
fiction, where the idea of sympathy, in Hina Nazar's words, became "a 
privileged ethical term in many nineteenth-century novels" (293). For 
George Eliot, the novelist perhaps most associated with philosophies 
of compassionate identification, this concept came to represent the 
possibility of the redemptive transfiguration of pain and suffering. 
Adam Bede, referring to such redemption, famously describes sympa-
thy as "the one poor word which includes all our best insight and our 
best love" (488). Such powerful Romantic and Victorian ideas about 
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the positive ethical value of literary empathy continue to define the 
way many writers conceptualize their role in modern society. 
Yet these celebrations of the ethical, civic, and even political po-
tential of empathetic art have not gone unchallenged. Henry James's 
The Portrait of a Lady (1881), for instance, reveals how the decep-
tively simple connection between "portrait" and "lady" constitutes an 
increasingly sinister bond between aesthetics and personhood. As 
Isabel Archer's vitality withers under her husband's connoisseuristic 
gaze, the novel suggests that looking at a work of art can inhibit rather 
than encourage generous identification with the lives of others. The 
novel even goes so far as to question its own complicity with such 
objectification, inviting us to ask if James's exquisite prose does not 
also contribute to Isabel's demise. Similarly, E. M. Forster's A Room 
with a View parodies the aesthete's ethical obtuseness when Lucy 
Honeychurch tells her fiancé Cecil, "You were all right as long as you 
kept to things, but when you came to people—" (199). The unsaid, 
and perhaps unsayable, conclusion to Lucy's indictment mimics the 
ethical blankness at the heart of Cecil's aestheticizing gaze. 
Even more radically than James and Forster, whose works in 
different ways sought to reclaim the human from the aesthetic, a 
competing strain of modernist writing strove to reject the claims of 
psychological fiction and its lavish empathetic celebration of the details 
of everyday consciousness. As Ella Zohar Ophir shows in her study of 
modernist antihumanism, writers such as Wyndham Lewis and Laura 
Riding created "pitiless fiction" that reflects "stark estimations of the 
significance of ordinary human lives" (111). For such writers, the great 
bulk of humanity is not fully human at all. Since such modernists 
were eager to divide "the autonomous few from the automatic many" 
(100), they distrusted the power of empathy because it threatened 
to blur the lines between the strength of autonomous selfhood and 
the force of the automatic crowd. Their works often seized on the 
anesthetic properties of comedy and abstraction to ensure a detached 
and pitiless gaze on the hapless characters of their fiction. Writers 
like James, Forster, Lewis, and Riding all sought in different ways 
to question the utopian alignment among art, empathy, and human 
ethical development they inherited from the Romantics. 
In many respects, the alternative late-twentieth-century reality 
of Never Let Me Go reflects a world that the antihumanist modern-
ists would have recognized. The lives of the genetically-engineered 
students seem fundamentally automatic and mechanized: they 
move through the stages of their lives with the regularity of students 
promoted from grade to grade, seemingly blind to the horrors that 
shadow their march toward suffering and death. Any protest against 
this system of values, conscious or unconscious, is met with ridicule 
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by their peers, who do as much as the barely registered system of 
teachers and doctors to maintain their status as machines without 
the capacity to resist their own exploitation. This vision provides one 
logical extreme of the twentieth century obsession with challenges 
to the definition of the human. As Jonathan Greenberg reminds us, 
"It is now something of a commonplace to note that in the twentieth 
century, the mechanization of the human seemed to be accelerating 
as a consequence of changes in technology and capitalist produc-
tion" (590).
Indeed, the world of Never Let Me Go deeply resonates with 
twentieth-century legacies of modern totalitarian repression. The 
regulated and automated sense of personhood in the novel evokes 
Giorgio Agamben's theory of homo sacer, or the identity of one 
whose "entire existence is reduced to a bare life stripped of every 
right by virtue of the fact that anyone can kill him without commit-
ting homicide" (183). Like homo sacer, Ishiguro's students can be 
killed but not sacrificed; their deaths by organ removal create no 
source of transcendent meaning for them or for their community. 
Agamben identifies a central locus of such "bare life" in the mod-
ern concentration camp, a paradoxical space included in political 
life only by means of its radical exclusion. Like A Pale View of Hills 
(1982), An Artist of the Floating World (1986), The Remains of the 
Day (1989), and When We Were Orphans (2000), which all respond 
in different ways to the Second World War, Never Let Me Go can be 
read as a meditation on a world shaped by the eugenic fantasies of 
Nazi-era incarceration. Hailsham, the English boarding school-like 
institution where Ishiguro's characters grow up, provides precisely 
such a shadowy territory beyond the admissible political life of the 
realm it inhabits and enables. Such a space strips its inhabitants of 
their claims to any forms of political identity; denuded of citizenship 
and culture, they represent a form of life that challenges traditional 
definitions of what it means to be human.
The novel's evocation of this concentrationary universe does 
much to remind us that late-twentieth-century art in the aftermath of 
the Holocaust has generated powerful anxieties about the possibility 
and desirability of empathy. If victims of the Holocaust underwent 
unspeakable agonies and erasures, representations of their suffering— 
particularly by those without firsthand experience—are frequently 
seen as exemplars of dehumanizing pornography. Aesthetic pleasure 
and empathetic identification appear antithetical to one another, 
mocking the very idea of human solidarity in light of such atrocity.3 
In the post-Holocaust era, not only the ethics but also the efficacy 
of empathy has undergone skepticism and scrutiny. The late twen-
tieth century saw the rise of phrases like "compassion fatigue" that 
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bespeak the failure of representation to encourage action on others' 
behalf. As Carolyn J. Dean suggests, such discourses of numbness 
have generated "a new, highly self-conscious narrative about the 
collective constriction of moral availability, if not empathy" (5). This 
skepticism about empathy's humanizing capacity sets the stage for 
the central drama of Never Let Me Go.
Building on such critiques, Never Let Me Go indicts humanist art 
because such art works to keep the students unaware of their own 
inhumanity—it masks their own mechanical condition and serves to 
prepare them for lives of exploitation. As Romantic theories of self-ex-
pression become horrifyingly literal in the act of organ donation, they 
reveal the dystopian potential of such an aesthetic. However, while 
Ishiguro's novel rejects the promise of traditional humanism, it does 
not ultimately subscribe to the disdain for automata that characterizes 
strands of earlier modernist writing; nor does it wholly replicate the 
later critiques of pornography or numbness that have emerged after 
the Holocaust. To create an alternative, the novel offers a thematic 
and stylistic vision of inhuman art to enable a very different kind of 
identification with the bare lives of others. This vision suggests how 
it might be possible to empathize with a mechanized version of homo 
sacer, a form of life that eludes traditional sympathy. 
Betrayals of Empathy 
At first glance, Never Let Me Go seems a surprising candidate 
for such a claim. In many clear and subtle ways, the novel does ap-
pear to bolster the ideals of liberal humanist art and liberal humanist 
empathy.4 A habitual user of second-person address, the narrator 
Kathy immediately constructs her readers as listeners who know 
more than they really do about the workings of her world. "My name 
is Kathy H.," she begins the novel. "I'm thirty-one years old, and I've 
been a carer now for over eleven years. That sounds long enough, I 
know, but actually they want me to go on for another eight months" 
(3). The deprecating restraint of her tone enables her to identify 
with the audience of her story ("that sounds long enough, I know"), 
while she assumes a readership who understands what it means 
to be a "carer" and how long carers normally stay in their position. 
Even though we do not know these details at this point in the novel, 
we are cast as characters with whom Kathy shares a frame of refer-
ence, and this reassuring gesture invites us to return the favor. Her 
narration is peppered with rhetorical devices that implicate us in the 
world of the novel: "I don't know how it was where you were," she 
says, "but at Hailsham we had to have some form of medical almost 
every week" (13). This performance of liberal empathy pulls us into 
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Kathy's world, asserting fundamental likeness between teller and 
listener at every turn.
However, this positive vision of Kathy's generous impulse is un-
dercut by many elements of her own story, which suggest the darker 
narrative that shadows the surface tale of her life as a caretaker. 
What is Kathy really doing as a "carer"? She is helping clones like her, 
created for organ donation, accept a life of painful and debilitating 
operations that rob them of their vital organs. All in their twenties 
and thirties, the donors will "complete"—the word die is never used—
after their fourth organ donation. Some "complete" much earlier, 
after only one or two donations. As she tells us, Kathy is prized for 
keeping her patients calm: "hardly any of them have been classified 
as 'agitated,' even before fourth donation" (3). All this empathy, it 
seems, has one purpose only: to reconcile patients to their brief lives 
of terrible suffering and imminent death. 
The complacency of the cloned students has provoked intense 
outrage among Ishiguro's readers, who cannot understand why Kathy 
and virtually all other characters in the novel express so little explicit 
anger at their condition and take so few steps to contest their fate. 
Ishiguro makes it clear that while the students grow up in isolated 
institutions across England, they are not permanently separated from 
what they think of as regular society: they live in a simulation of 
college at "The Cottages" in their late teens, acquire driver's licenses 
and travel around England, meet regular people in shops and offices, 
and entertain the possibility of sexual relationships with them. But 
though the students witness first-hand how others live, their resis-
tance against their proscribed fate is horrifyingly modest. As Harper 
Barnes, reviewing the novel for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, pointedly 
imagines: "if you were scheduled to have your organs plucked out any 
day now, but in the meantime were permitted to wander around the 
British countryside pretty much as you chose, wouldn't you decide 
at some point, 'This is a really bad deal, and I'm moving to France'?" 
Except for the student Tommy, whose uncontrollable rages hint at 
a repressed apprehension of his fate, none of the characters seem 
overly troubled by their impending suffering and death. 
Readers of the novel have frequently explained this signature 
discrepancy through the lens of liberal empathy. As we identify with 
the students, the argument goes, we realize that they are actually 
much like us. Some readers stress that the clones, despite the bio-
logical characteristics that set them apart from their models, assert 
their fundamental humanity throughout the course of the narrative. 
Reviewers who interpret the novel in this light, as "a 1984 for the 
bioengineering age" (Browning) and "essential reading for everyone 
associated with the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority" 
Ishiguro’s Inhuman Aesthetics792
(Taylor), defend Kathy as a being with feelings and sufferings to re-
spect. Other readers reverse this logic to recognize our own society 
in the world of the characters. Rather than pitying the clones for their 
plight, we should appreciate how our own approach to death, suffer-
ing, and constraint may not be entirely different. M. John Harrison 
adopts this approach in his review for the Guardian: "This extraor-
dinary and, in the end, rather frighteningly clever novel isn't about 
cloning, or being a clone, at all. It's about why we don't explode, 
why we don't just wake up one day and go sobbing and crying down 
the street, kicking everything to pieces out of the raw, infuriating, 
completely personal sense of our lives never having been what they 
could have been." Like Kathy and her classmates, regular humans 
can go to extreme lengths to repress the knowledge of their deaths 
and to reconcile themselves to their diminished lives. As the major-
ity of reviewers comment, Ishiguro's previous novels—especially 
The Remains of the Day—all offer us such portraits of repression 
in action. Indeed, this commitment to consoling and compensatory 
narratives constitutes what many readers, in Brian Shaffer's terms, 
see as Ishiguro's "master theme" (122).
At one level, the novel does enact these identifications: it does 
invite us to recognize Kathy as human, and it does invite us to ac-
knowledge the ways in which we too accede to the limitations of our 
own lives. But it also complicates these identifications in disturbing 
ways. Our condition as readers exactly mirrors the education of the 
students themselves: "'you've been told and not told,'" a subversive 
teacher tells her students in a failed attempt to shake them out of 
complacency. "'You've been told, but none of you really understand'" 
(Never 81). The same could be said of the readers of the novel, who 
return to the first few pages and wonder how they could have missed 
the sinister significance of such words as "donor" and "carer." Our 
own comfortable sense of empathetic solidarity with Kathy ultimately 
constitutes the horror of the novel's rhetorical technique. It is this 
deeper and more dangerous identification, figured in the predicament 
of being "told and not told," that challenges the performance of a 
safe liberal empathy. 
As the novel proceeds to betray its own invitation to empathetic 
humanist identification, it resonates with Rebecca Walkowitz's descrip-
tion of Ishiguro as an artist of treason. "Committed to change but 
also to conflict," Walkowitz argues, "Ishiguro commits to treason: his 
floating worlds betray their narrators, and they everywhere betray 
'us'" (130). Similarly, Claire Pégon-Davison claims that Ishiguro's 
work tends to "invite, but also thwart, representational and emotional 
identification" (251). As we will see, the novel plays with the sinis-
ter possibilities of such identification in its millennial tale of British 
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anxieties about globalization and of the role of art in perpetuating its 
inequalities. As Never Let Me Go accentuates the dystopic potential 
latent within Ishiguro's earlier narratives, its parable invites us to 
rethink the terms of our empathy.
Humanist Art, Human Repression
Why is it that the characters in the novel fail to stage a rebel-
lion, protest their fate, or move to France? In keeping with his past 
novels that center on repression, Ishiguro never suggests explicitly 
how the students accept their lives as carers and donors, even when 
they realize the inequality of their situation. Hailsham offers no heroic 
or theological ideology to comfort the students; no elevating talk of 
sacrifice infiltrates Ishiguro's prose. "'I was pretty much ready when I 
became a donor,'" a student named Ruth says. "'It felt right. After all, 
it's what we're supposed to be doing, isn't it?'" (227). Such ordinary 
and even banal language suffices to convince students to acquiesce 
to their own extraordinary demise.
In keeping with the spirit of Ishiguro's previous novels, the social 
norms that lead to these radical consequences seem innocuous, for 
they are the social norms of good professionals. As scholars such 
as Bruce Robbins and Ryan Trimm have argued, Ishiguro specializes 
in showing how moral crimes or ethical lapses often stem from the 
desire of ordinary individuals to adhere to the everyday codes that 
give their lives structure and meaning.5 These professional codes 
enable political abuses (such as Japanese fascism or Nazi sympathy) 
and personal failures (such as the neglect of one's family). It is not 
surprising, then, that Ishiguro again indicts a modern profession in 
Never Let Me Go. 
What is particularly painful, however, is that this profession 
is in some sense Ishiguro's own: the profession of the artist. As in 
The Unconsoled, which dramatizes the predicament of a bewildered 
musician, Never Let Me Go illuminates the problems that arise when 
art becomes a governing ideological force.6 To professionalize its stu-
dents, Hailsham builds a virtual electric fence through an emphasis 
on artistic production. From an early age, the guardians encourage 
their students to develop their "creativity" through poetry, painting, 
and sculpture (22). Student work circulates within Hailsham at the 
"Exchanges," where students buy the work of their classmates to 
decorate their beds and fill out their "collections" (16). Exceptionally 
good work is appropriated by a woman known only as Madame, who 
is said to run a Gallery filled with outstanding student art. Although 
the students do not know why creative art is so highly valued, they 
hear rumors that their art reveals their souls, and eventually they 
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come to believe that this evidence of their inner lives may allow them 
deferrals before beginning their donations. 
Threaded throughout the novel, these elusive references to the 
importance of art become explicit only at the end of the story. When 
Kathy and her boyfriend Tommy eventually track down Madame and 
Miss Emily, the former headmistress of Hailsham, they demand to 
know why the art was considered so crucial to their upbringing. In 
the rather improbable denouement of the novel, Miss Emily confesses 
that "'we took away your art because we thought it would reveal your 
souls. Or to put it more finely, we did it to prove you had souls at all'" 
(260). As advocates for compassionate treatment of clones (whom 
they always call "students"), Madame and Miss Emily use art shows 
to convince others of their students' right to humane consideration. 
Art, they believe, will inspire regular people to identify with the stu-
dents and thus recognize their ethical obligations toward them—a 
theory that resonates with the Romantic relationship between art 
and moral action. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this advocacy movement ultimately fails. 
To be sure, it does so because the audience, far from being touched by 
the accomplishments of the clones, begins to feel threatened by their 
impressive talents. But the demise of this movement also resonates 
with modern psychological accounts that temper earlier exuberance 
about the relationship between art and ethics. In Empathy and the 
Novel, Suzanne Keen argues that psychological studies and reader-
response experiments offer scant proof that audience reactions to 
art actually lead to measurable behavior on the behalf of others: 
"The evidence for a relationship between narrative empathy and the 
prosocial motivation of actual readers does not support the grand 
claims often made on behalf of empathy," she contends (145). The 
logic of Never Let Me Go speaks to this finding; looking at art, at 
least for the bulk of the novel's regular citizens, appears to cultivate 
narrow self-interest rather than altruistic obligation.
Even more crucially, what Madame and Miss Emily do not confess 
to Kathy and Tommy is that the underlying role of clone-produced 
art is far more sinister. Concealed within their Romantic logic lies a 
far more dystopian goal that colludes with the exploitation of the 
students they claim to protect.7 When Miss Emily says that "'your 
art will reveal your inner selves'" (Never 254), her choice of phrase 
suggests that making such art actually prefigures the process of or-
gan donation. From a young age, children grow accustomed to the 
idea of handing over their "inner selves" to figures of authority. For 
such donations they are literally paid in "Tokens"—one of Ishiguro's 
most frightening wordplays. Furthermore, through their seasonal 
Exchanges, students barter their own work to buy the sculptures, 
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paintings, and poems of their classmates. Held four times a year, the 
rhythm of the Exchanges mirrors the four organ donations that each 
student expects, or hopes, to make. 
As the practice of circulating artwork reflects the circulation of 
vital body parts, it furthers three central assumptions that work to 
repress the students' possible resistance. First, the students become 
dependent on their community for a robust sense of selfhood. "I can 
see now, too, how the Exchanges had a more subtle effect on us all," 
Kathy muses. "If you think about it, being dependent on each other 
to produce the stuff that might become your private treasures—that's 
bound to do things to your relationships" (16). As the students become 
more and more emotionally bound to each other through the exchange 
of art, they gradually lose their ability to imagine themselves outside 
the system that governs their collective lives. As a result, they find 
it difficult to consider independent action. When Kathy and Tommy 
ask a dying Ruth why she never pursued her dream to work in an 
office, Ruth can only offer a lackluster response: "'You say I should 
have looked into it. How? Where would I have gone? There wasn't 
a way to look into it'" (231). Ruth offers this defeatist account even 
though she has an address for Madame, the figure all the students 
believe can shape their destiny. Although Ruth is cast as a strong 
and even manipulative figure who likes to brag about her intimacy 
with figures of authority, her passivity as an individual testifies to 
the network of relationships that prevents her from actually pursuing 
any such individual resistance. The circulation of student art helps to 
shape community bonds that keep the students, as peers, moving in 
lockstep toward their deaths.
Second, this emphasis on artwork encourages an instrumental 
philosophy of individual worth. While Madame and Miss Emily believe 
that showing regular people student art will assert intrinsic over in-
strumental personhood, the novel reveals exactly the opposite process 
at Hailsham. "A lot of the time, how you were regarded at Hailsham, 
how much you were liked and respected, had to do with how good 
you were at 'creating,'" Kathy tells us (16). In keeping with this as-
sumption, students feel justified in humiliating Tommy because of 
his artistic failures. "'The reason they go for Tommy's because he's 
a layabout,'" one student says. "Then everyone was talking at once, 
about how Tommy never even tried to be creative" (10). If artistic 
capability reveals humanity, then lack of artistic capability provides a 
license for exploitation. The Exchanges encourage students to think 
instrumentally about the worth of their peers, thus preparing them 
for an acceptance of their own instrumental lives. 
Third, and most cruel, the Exchanges encourage students to 
believe that they actually partake in a real exchange. They give up 
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their own art and receive other works in return, but, of course, they 
will receive no one else's organs to replace the ones they eventually 
donate. While we might expect the ideology of Hailsham to focus 
on the heroic elevation of donation and self-sacrifice without the 
sullying hope of payment, the reality is just the opposite. Through 
the Exchanges students come to believe that they participate in an 
economy of circulation rather than of extraction. This myth is per-
petrated even more fully through the Sales, which enable students 
to "buy" things from the outside world. While the students purchase 
clothing, music, and other items from the Sales, Ishiguro's descrip-
tion of the goods suggests, with excruciating irony, that these objects 
are actually donations from regular society. "The boxes were open 
at the top, so you'd catch glimpses of all kinds of things," Kathy 
remembers. "All sorts of rumours would be going around, maybe 
about a particular track suit or a music cassette" (42). This jumbled 
collection of cardboard boxes that contain only singular items seems 
like the discarded goods of regular citizens, and since the students 
pay for their choices with tokens, any actual monetary exchange is 
only a formality. As with the Exchanges, the Sales mask a donation 
economy within the guise of egalitarian circulation. What seems re-
ciprocal is always only one way.
In critiquing an apparent circulation that masks simple extraction 
and exploitation, Never Let Me Go can be said to offer a metaphor 
for the inequalities and predations of national and global economic 
systems. While Kathy and her classmates prefigure a futuristic world 
of genetic technology, they also reflect an existing late-twentieth- 
and early-twenty-first-century reality of growing economic imbal-
ances. On the national level, the creation of a service class for organ 
donation extends the principles of the British class system to its 
most horrifying extreme. Indeed, the clones believe themselves to 
have been modeled on lower class citizens, such as prostitutes. As 
a global metaphor, the condition of the students also speaks to the 
fate of postcolonial and migrant laborers who sustain the privileges 
of First World economies, the fortune of soldiers called on to serve 
in Afghanistan or Iraq, or the collateral damage of civilians killed in 
war so that other nations might maintain their power. While Ishiguro 
rarely refers explicitly in the novel to such phenomena, he makes this 
parallel between the clones and service classes easy to draw. If First 
World economies desire labor without the inconvenient presence of 
human laborers (whose needs and wants complicate the seamless 
functioning of modern industrial life), the instrumental bodies of 
Kathy and her classmates offer the logical and terrifying realization 
of such a view. These similarities may help to explain why the novel 
resembles not a fantastical future, but instead the period in time 
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noted for accelerating economic imbalances worldwide: its epigraph 
reads "England, late 1990s."
This critique seems most unnerving because the novel, in Ishig-
uro's characteristic style, renders these resemblances to the current 
globalizing world conspicuous through their near-invisibility. The 
ethnic diversity that typifies divisions of labor in multicultural nations 
and global capitalism, for example, is virtually erased in Never Let 
Me Go. Kathy H., for instance, never describes her fellow students 
in readily identifiable ethnic terms. The students' first names (their 
last names are given only as initials) are traditionally associated with 
white, middle-class England: Kathy, Ruth, Tommy, Chrissie, Rodney, 
and Steve offer a representative sampling of names that suggest a 
mainstream cultural provenance. But these names tell us nothing, 
because these students have no parents to name them. They could 
be modeled on people from any race, but since they are the products 
of institutions, they lose any possible connection to groups outside 
the boarding schools that shape their youth. Whatever their skin color 
may be, and Ishiguro is silent on this point, these students have no 
meaningful ethnicity in the terms of the novel. Their truncated identi-
ties suggest the triumph of a white, fascistic racial ideal that effectively 
obliterates the markers of multicultural Britain so common in the late 
1990s. Kathy H., thirty-one at the time of her narration, would have 
been cloned around the time of Enoch Powell's notorious 1968 outcry 
against the changing racial composition of Britain.8 The deracinated 
world of Never Let Me Go seems to figure what England might have 
become, had Powell had his way. Homogenized, deprived of cultural 
specificity, and raised to serve the needs of others, the condition of 
the students also offers a frightening parable for the assimilative 
energies of First World metropoles that absorb the embodied labor 
and cultural identity of people from diverse parts of the world. Non-
clones retain the possibility of cultural identity—Miss Emily refers to 
her medical assistant as "George, the big Nigerian man" (256–57),9 
and Madame is described as French—but the world of Hailsham is a 
world of cultural sameness, a normative ideal of white, middle class 
culture. While Ishiguro has sometimes been accused of embracing 
postethnicity in the guise of whiteness, Never Let Me Go affiliates 
postethnicity not with promise but with peril.10 
This cultural erasure is part of the strategic genocide that gradu-
ally unfolds in the novel. Like the Jews deprived of their citizenship 
when sent to concentration camps, the students' loss of cultural 
specificity signals one tactic by which they lose their purchase on 
human identity. As Agamben argues in his reading of denationaliza-
tion in the camps,
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The correct question to pose concerning the horrors com-
mitted in the camps is, therefore, not the hypocritical one 
of how crimes of such atrocity could be committed against 
human beings. It would be more honest and, above all, 
more useful to investigate carefully the juridical procedures 
and deployments of power by which human beings could be 
so completely deprived of their rights and prerogatives that 
no act committed against them could appear any longer 
as a crime. (171)
Never Let Me Go points to precisely such absences that render its 
characters less than fully human in their world. In doing so, it sug-
gests how the terrifyingly familiar tactics of totalitarianism reemerge 
within late-twentieth-century globalization. Transnational economies 
of circulation and exchange, evoked through the transmission of 
art, reveal themselves to be closed systems that actually resemble 
concentration camps. 
As the circulation of artwork paradoxically both mirrors and 
masks the most insidious effects of globalization and totalitarian-
ism, the novel quietly indicts the very idea of humanist art that it 
seems at first to support. Revealing one's insides, a commonplace 
way of praising the emotional authenticity and value of expression, 
emerges as a form of extraction that makes art-making as exploit-
ative as organ donation.11 As the opiate of the students, "creativity" 
comes to seem as loaded a euphemism as "carer," "donation," and 
"completion." Dehumanizing rather than humanizing for the artist and 
the audience, the kind of art fostered at Hailsham—art that claims 
to reveal the soul but that actually prefigures the dismemberment 
of the students' bodies—represents a form of sinister ethical failure 
in Never Let Me Go. 
Textual Cloning, Inhuman Art
What, then, do we make of Ishiguro's own work as an artist? 
Does the prose style of Never Let Me Go participate in the patterns 
of extraction and repression it exposes? To construct an alternative, 
Ishiguro's novel offers an aesthetic based on cloning that works in 
opposition to the predatory "creativity" suffered by its characters. 
While discourses skeptical of humanist empathy have often encoded 
gestures of refusal into the structure of their narrative, Never Let 
Me Go declines to abandon the possibility of empathy through art.12 
Using stylistic characteristics of repetition and replication, Ishiguro 
expresses a solidarity with the students more forceful than any act 
of liberal empathy in the novel. His own inhuman style offers what 
Hailsham's humanist art cannot. 
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Writing about clones suits Ishiguro, who has been powerfully 
described by Louis Menand as a novelist of simulacra. When Never Let 
Me Go was published, Menand argued that Ishiguro is best understood 
not as a psychological realist, but instead as a writer impersonating 
a psychological realist. Menand claims in a review of Never Let Me 
Go: "There is something animatronic about [Ishiguro's characters]. 
They are simulators of humanness, figures engineered to pass as 
'real.' Genetic engineering—the idea of human beings as products 
programmed to pick up 'personhood skills'—is a perfect vehicle for 
a writer like Ishiguro." The design for the Vintage International pa-
perback cover of the novel reinforces this vision of identity, featur-
ing a close-up photograph of a young and attractive white woman 
whose face seems extraordinarily realistic but also glassily artificial. 
If Ishiguro is not exactly a realist, what then does his work seek to 
accomplish? Katherine Stanton, building on Menand's insight, argues 
that Ishiguro's work "is far more interested in ethical experimentation 
than in psychological realism" (15).13 Like Ishiguro's earlier fiction, 
Never Let Me Go invites us to focus on an ethical experiment in the 
aesthetics of simulacra.
Through its mimicry of psychological life, the style of the novel 
thematizes the problems of repetition and replication that character-
ize genetic engineering. In short, it models its style on the process of 
cloning. This aesthetic appears through dominant rhetorical gestures 
that dramatize, again and again, the troubling importance of repeti-
tion and mimicry. On the most basic level, Kathy repeatedly uses the 
same device to introduce new episodes in the narrative: "That was 
when I first understood, really understood, just how lucky we'd been," 
she says at the beginning of the novel (6). Variants on this theme, 
in which Kathy introduces a new idea by stating that she only now 
realizes its significance, occur regularly throughout the narrative. In 
a novel thematizing genetic replication, this mode of stylistic pat-
terning gives new significance to what Adam Zachary Newton calls 
Ishiguro's "interruptive structure" (279). Repeated several times, 
even to the point of narrative tedium, this gesture comes to resemble 
the act of cloning. 
Told in flashback mode, Kathy's narrative positions the creation 
of new material as another kind of repetition: a memory. In Never 
Let Me Go, one of Ishiguro's trademark narrative strategies acquires 
a new and unsettling significance.14 Since the novel reflects Kathy's 
rereading of her past, memory serves as the symbolic clone of ex-
perience. For her readers, these memories become more substantial 
than the original experiences they document (to which we have no 
direct access). As the beginning of the novel reveals, students come 
to desire memories that can erase the dystopias of their own lives. 
Speaking about her idyllic childhood in Hailsham to a donor, Kathy 
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comes to realize that the donor—who grew up in much less progres-
sive surroundings—wants to embrace her memories as his own. "What 
he wanted was not just to hear about Hailsham, but to remember 
Hailsham, just like it had been his own childhood" (5). Kathy thus 
creates memories as a repetition, or clone, of experience, and then 
copies them for others who have even less than she to fall back on 
during the agonies of donation. The clone comes to supplant the 
original through the gesture of memory.
Counterpointing these repetitions at the level of the sentence 
are the broader forms of mimicry that seem to bear out Jean Bau-
drillard's predictions for science fiction in an age of simulacra. In its 
portraits of the social lives of its characters, the texture of the coun-
terfactual world of Never Let Me Go resonates with familiar (perhaps 
even overfamiliar) banalities of modern coterie school culture. While 
the world of the novel erases many salient historical realities (such 
as ethnic diversity), it nonetheless refuses the elaborate and exotic 
fantasizing of social difference that usually characterizes science fic-
tion. As Baudrillard theorizes, 
It is no longer possible to fabricate the unreal from the 
real, the imaginary from the givens of the real. The process 
will, rather, be the opposite: it will be to put decentered 
situations, models of simulation in place and to contrive 
to give them the feeling of the real, of the banal, of lived 
experience, to reinvent the real as fiction, precisely because 
it has disappeared from our lives. (124)
Like Julian Barnes's England, England (1998), which most vividly 
reflects the rise of a culture of simulacra, Ishiguro's prose provides 
such a "model of simulation" and gives it "the feeling of the real." 
In a different kind of novel, such micro and macro repetitions might 
be read as aesthetic failings. But, given its narrative investment in 
genetic engineering, the novel invites us to subvert the ordinary 
hierarchy that favors the original over the repetition. As Baudrillard 
would claim, the simulation is now the ultimate reality (126).15
To combat the predations of liberal creativity, the novel offers 
us a representation of art that replicates the actual condition of the 
clones, rather than the humanist delusions that Hailsham foists on 
them. Tommy, the only character in the novel who subconsciously 
intuits the agony of his fate, significantly refuses to collaborate in 
the process of art-making at Hailsham. When he finally does decide 
to put pen to paper of his own accord, he produces a striking set 
of small and intricately detailed animals that offer a metaphor for 
Ishiguro's own work: "The first impression was like one you'd get 
if you took the back off a radio set: tiny canals, weaving tendons, 
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miniature screws and wheels were all drawn with obsessive preci-
sion, and only when you held the page away could you see it was 
some kind of armadillo, say, or a bird" (Never 187). Although Tommy 
makes these images in the hopes that they will reveal his soul and 
thus allow him to defer his donations, his art (like his anger) knows 
more than his conscious mind can express. Tommy's drawings of 
imaginary animals reveal "the soul" to be an illusion; if we open up 
the animal, we find only the workings of an intricate form of machin-
ery. In Eluned Summers-Bremner's formulation, the novel's turn to 
nonhuman imagery "represents the failure of the inhuman to mask 
humanity's fear of death" (145); it exposes the fundamental secret 
that the characters so carefully repress. As Kathy reveals, Tommy's 
new aesthetic runs counter to the values of their education: "what 
I was looking at was so different from anything the guardians had 
taught us to do at Hailsham" (Never 187). This inhuman art, which 
marries the animal with the automatic, provides an alternative to the 
destructive visions of soul-based humanity that the novel critiques. 
Art that exposes soullessness, not soulfulness, offers the truer vision 
of Tommy's simulated life. Ishiguro's vision of late-twentieth-century 
mechanical culture thus resonates with Donna Haraway's famous 
declaration that "we are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hy-
brids of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs" (150). To 
be most human, in the world of the novel, is to recognize oneself 
as inhuman.
And yet these small mechanical creatures still invite a prosocial 
ethics of care that revitalizes the possibility of empathy through art. 
"'You have to think about how they'd protect themselves, how they'd 
reach things,'" Tommy confesses to Kathy (178). Kathy herself comes 
to feel that "for all their busy, metallic features, there was something 
sweet, even vulnerable about each of them" (188). This description 
offers a perfect emblem of Ishiguro's own characters, who often 
appear eerily and purposefully artificial. One reviewer of Ishiguro's 
novel aptly describes Kathy as "a speaking clock" (Taylor); and yet 
it is difficult not to be moved by her childhood innocence and her 
terrifying predicament. Precisely because Ishiguro's characters call 
attention to their own artificiality and their own role as simulacra, 
they make a claim on our empathy. Such identification, generated 
through an inhuman art of insistent repetition and stilted precision, 
provides an alternative to the destructive powers of Hailsham's per-
versely paradoxical ideas about artistic empathy and moral action. 
Ishiguro's cloned style thus makes an ethical demand: the absence 
of the soul does not signal the absence of prosocial imperatives.
This empathy enables the possibility not only for an ethics of 
care, but also for an ethics of self-knowledge. Emily Apter's model of 
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textual cloning, based on her reworking of Walter Benjamin's theory 
of art in the age of its reproducibility, helps to explain the aesthetic 
innovation of Never Let Me Go. While Apter specifically uses the idea 
of the clone to develop a theory of translations with no originals, 
her description of language as a metaphoric clone resembles the 
principles that Ishiguro's work seems to support. For Apter, when we 
can no longer distinguish between originals and clones, "the whole 
category of originality—as an essentialist life form—becomes subject 
to dispute" (213). Abandoning the need for fidelity to the original, in 
Ishiguro's world, would mean two paradoxical things: it would free 
the students from their imperative to serve the biomedical needs of 
their own originals, thus liberating them from subservience to the 
category of "human," while it would also allow them to celebrate 
openly their own identity as copy, as inhuman. 
The realism and value of the copy, prefigured in Tommy's 
drawings, best enables the characters to intuit the tragedy of their 
condition. Kathy, unaware of the significance of her findings, reveals 
an important change in Tommy's anti-Hailsham approach to art. As 
Tommy prepares for his fourth donation (or in other words, his death), 
he returns to the style of drawing that he inaugurated as a young 
man. "It came to me that Tommy's drawings weren't as fresh now," 
Kathy says. "Okay, in many ways these frogs were a lot like what I'd 
seen back at the Cottages. But something was definitely gone, and 
they looked laboured, almost like they'd been copied" (241). While 
Kathy, her sensibilities still governed so strongly by her nostalgia for 
Hailsham, views these pieces as diminished versions of Tommy's ear-
lier attempts, the novel suggests otherwise. Tommy, like Ishiguro, is 
literally making cloned art. The fabulist aesthetic of the frogs vividly 
mimics Tommy's own condition: the "something" that is "definitely 
gone" resonates with Tommy's missing three organs, and the "la-
boured" quality of the drawings mirrors the condition of his own body 
that labors in the aftermath of his surgeries. The novel encourages 
us to embrace such simulacra as the greatest form of realism: we 
are asked to change our allegiance from the humanist art fostered 
by Hailsham to the inhuman art of Ishiguro and Tommy.
The title of the novel, Never Let Me Go, gestures toward the 
most pressing replica of the story. As a child at Hailsham, Kathy 
treasures a cassette tape that contains a song called "Never Let Me 
Go." When she listens to the song, she pretends that the singer is 
celebrating the arrival of a baby whom she never thought she would 
bear. Long after Kathy's tape mysteriously disappears, she rediscovers 
a copy on a trip when she and Tommy rummage through second-hand 
stores. "Then suddenly I felt a huge pleasure—and something else, 
something more complicated that threatened to make me burst into 
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tears," Kathy reveals (172). As Never Let Me Go becomes a copy 
within itself, and even (with the found cassette) a copy of a copy, 
it offers Kathy a way to mourn the unspeakable tragedy of her own 
condition. In Kathy's childhood, the replica of the novel's title allows 
her to grieve for her losses without realizing it; for like the imagined 
singer, Kathy never expects to become a mother. Her inner life is 
best expressed not through the extraction of her soul, but through 
the power of a replica.
The phrase "never let me go" is the only sentence in the novel 
that explicitly rages against the condition of the students: it articu-
lates the symbolic, unheard cry of the subject on the operating table 
who faces the unknown after a fourth donation. It is the only real 
statement of resistance in the novel, all the more powerful for being 
misunderstood by the characters whose fate it registers. The novel 
thus implies that only the replica, the simulacrum, or the symbolic 
clone has the power to illuminate the contradictions of Kathy's own 
life. Only, perhaps, the inhuman has the power to offer her a non-
exploitative sense of her life as a person.
As with all of Ishiguro's novels, what does not appear—what 
lurks on the fringes of the narrative—is often the most important 
specter in the story. When the novel invites us to extend sympa-
thies beyond the category of human, it recognizes this category as 
exclusionary and troubling in itself. The implicit analogies between 
deracinated, genetically-engineered students and exploited workers in 
a multicultural Britain and a globalizing economy ask us to recognize 
how many people in our own world are not considered fully human. 
Like the clones, they are consigned to the barely visible worlds of 
service to others that, in extreme situations, give rise to Agamben's 
homo sacer. Yet despite the repudiation of humanist empathy, we 
are not allowed to give up on the empathetic potential of art. As 
Andrew Joron writes in his call for a poetics of the inhuman, "If we 
have arrived too late to rescue the natural body, we must learn to 
awaken the Inhuman object found in its place" (210). Novels like 
Ishiguro's do not promote an aesthetic of detachment, like those we 
find in antihumanist writings that celebrate an unforgiving distance 
between fellow beings. We come to value Kathy's voice not in spite 
of her affiliation with automata—her role as a "speaking clock"—but 
because of such seemingly inhuman characteristics that bespeak her 
life as simulacrum. As she illuminates the aspects of our own lives 
that are less than fully human, identifying with Kathy generates a 
new aesthetics of empathy for a posthumanist age.
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Notes
 I would like to thank Tanya Agathocleous and the anonymous readers 
of Modern Fiction Studies for their helpful comments on an earlier 
version of this essay. 
1. The Oxford English Dictionary actually cites an earlier appearance of 
empathy in 1904, but most scholars credit Tichener with its popu-
larization.
2. The theory of motor mimicry has provided a starting point for later 
work in developmental psychology. For example, Omdahl under-
stands motor mimicry to be central to Martin Hoffman's work, and 
thematizing this aspect of Hoffman enables Ohmdahl to create the 
basis for her own model (Omdahl 25). Lauren Wispé also argues in 
her own theory that "muscle mimicry and visual imagery, working 
together, provide the means for the release of sympathy" (154). See 
also Goleman (98–99). 
3. On such critiques of empathy, see Dean (16–42).
4. Ishiguro's earlier novels are often read as invitations to liberal em-
pathy, as seen in the work of Wall and Wong. Wall argues that one 
of the effects of unreliable narration in The Remains of the Day is to 
question the very idea of reliable narration, and this instability opens 
up a space for the reader to experience heightened empathy for the 
character. "We do not feel the same degree of arrogant superiority 
to Stevens that we do to those narrators whose accounts indicate 
fissures and inconsistencies of Grand Canyon proportions," she argues 
(37). Similarly, Wong generalizes from Ishiguro's first four novels 
that "though a reader may suspect the narrator's deception, their 
open admission of real human flaws gains a reader's empathy. . . . 
Because each of the main characters also suffers tremendous losses 
of both personal and professional kinds, readers may gain additional 
empathy for them" (24). The narrative strategies of Never Let Me 
Go do dramatize the possibility of such affinities between reader and 
character, but, as we will see, they also suggest an evolving critique 
of such humanist empathy in Ishiguro's work.
5. See, especially, Robbins (426) and Trimm (135–61).
6. The specific role of art has not gained much currency in studies of 
The Unconsoled, as seen in the readings of Lewis, Wong, and Shaffer, 
which tend to read the novel in terms of its stylistic and psychological 
dreamworlds of displacement.
7. In this sense, Deborah Britzman's reading of the name "Hailsham" 
is germane: "The name means what it says: the children, with no 
parents, are greeted by a sham that they can't quite figure out but 
that manages to hail them" (313).
8. In 1968, the British politician Enoch Powell delivered a famous speech 
that railed against the growing racial diversity of England and pre-
dicted "the River Tiber foaming with much blood" (Powell). Powell's 
speech became an iconic image of British xenophobia and racism.
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9. Here, in the world outside the clones, Ishiguro does represent a 
racialized division of labor.
10. For more on Ishiguro's relationship to whiteness, see Ma (71–88).
11. Britzman's psychoanalytic reading offers a different perspective on 
the novel's dystopian critique of aesthetics, arguing that "while read-
ing, we really do rob someone's insides" (317). However, Britzman's 
interpretation does not differentiate between the distinct forms of 
empathetic aesthetic engagement that I find depicted in the novel.
12. For accounts of such refusals, see Sommer (on literature) and Shuman 
(on personal stories). 
13. To read in this vein is to read Ishiguro's work against the grain, as 
well as against the psychological realist emphasis favored by Shaf-
fer, Wong, and Burton. Wong, for instance, argues for the realism of 
Ishiguro's duplicitous narrators by presenting them as "like actual 
writers" and "like actual people" (19). While many of the psychologi-
cal patterns these critics identify in earlier novels are also at work in 
Never Let Me Go, I suggest that too strong an emphasis on psycho-
logical realism can conceal the ways in which Ishiguro's mannered 
and retrospective narratives constitute challenges to the very literary 
conventions of the human that they invoke. 
14. Kathy's often nostalgic mode of narration aligns her with past nar-
rators of Ishiguro's novels. Exploring the impact of such backward 
longing, John Su argues that Ishiguro's use of nostalgia in The Re-
mains of the Day is both critical and productive, enabling the novel 
to constitute an ethos of national character through its expression of 
disappointment and decline (555). I suggest that with Never Let Me 
Go, it is now the form of the retrospective, rather than its content, 
that best exemplifies the significance of Ishiguro's flashback narra-
tion.
15. Despite its surface similarity to Ishiguro's first novels, Never Let Me Go 
can be understood, like The Unconsoled, as a postmodern challenge 
to the narrative conventions of Ishiguro's earlier works. We might 
also understand this preoccupation with simulacra as a transforma-
tion of what Lewis identifies as the central role of displacement and 
homelessness in Ishiguro's oeuvre (1–17).
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